Incorporating Hidden Costs of Annoying Ads in Display Auctions by Stourm, Valeria & Bax, Eric
INCORPORATING HIDDEN COSTS OF ANNOYING ADS IN DISPLAY AUCTIONS
Valeria Stourm and Eric Bax1
Abstract
Media publisher platforms often face an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff: more an-
noying ads can be more effective for some advertisers because of their ability to attract
attention, but after attracting viewers’ attention, their nuisance to viewers can decrease
engagement with the platform over time. With the rise of mobile technology and ad
blockers, many platforms are becoming increasingly concerned about how to improve
monetization through digital ads while improving viewer experience.
We study an online ad auction mechanism that incorporates a charge for ad impact
on user experience as a criterion for ad selection and pricing. Like a Pigovian tax,
the charge causes advertisers to internalize the hidden cost of foregone future platform
revenue due to ad impact on user experience. Over time, the mechanism provides an
incentive for advertisers to develop ads that are effective while offering viewers a more
pleasant experience. We show that adopting the mechanism can simultaneously benefit
the publisher, advertisers, and viewers, even in the short term.
Incorporating a charge for ad impact can increase expected advertiser profits if
enough advertisers compete. A stronger effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, meaning that
ad effectiveness is more strongly associated with negative impact on user experience,
increases the amount of competition required for the mechanism to benefit advertisers.
The findings suggest that the mechanism can benefit the marketplace for ad slots that
consistently attract many advertisers.
1Valeria Stourm: Assistant Professor of Marketing, HEC Paris, stourmv@hec.fr, Eric Bax: Yahoo Labs,
ebax@yahoo-inc.com. The authors are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from the review team,
Michael Schwarz, Susan Athey, Preston McAfee, Ken Wilbur, Pinar Yildirim, Eric Bradlow, Ron Berman,
and participants of our research seminar at Wharton. The authors especially thank John Ledyard for advice
about Pigovian auctions in practice.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Digital display ads can sometimes be a nuisance to viewers. Publisher platforms, which
charge to place ads on webpages, have a vested interest in limiting negative ad impact
on viewer experience because it jeopardizes their long-term ability to deliver an engaged
audience to advertisers (Wilbur, Xu, and Kempe 2013). When estimating the advertising
elasticity of demand for TV, Wilbur et al. (2008) find that a 10% increase in advertising time
leads to a 25% reduction in audience size for a popular broadcast network. Goldstein et al.
(2014) experimentally measure a platform’s economic costs of serving annoying display ads
to viewers, and find that these costs seem to exceed the typical price that digital platforms
charge to advertisers.
Despite their negative impact on viewer experience, distracting or annoying ads tend
to be noticed more and thus can be more valuable to some advertisers. Ads that elicit
more extreme, even negative, reactions can sometimes be more effective than neutral ones
because they attract attention, facilitate memory for the advertised brand, and may even
enhance persuasion if their distraction inhibits counterarguing (Aaker and Bruzonne 1985,
Moore and Hutchinson 1983, Silk and Vavra 1974). As an example, more irritating television
commercials are better remembered and more likely to be recognized (Aaker and Bruzzone
1985). Similarly, online gamers have explicit memory for ads that they find annoying (Yeu
et al. 2013). More recently, Zhou et al. (2016) examined ads from Yahoo’s mobile news
stream. The quartile of ads with the highest click-through rates had the highest proportion
of highly offensive ads.
We use the term ad annoyance to refer to the degree to which an ad irritates viewers.
Aaker and Bruzzone (1985) describe annoying ads as “provoking, causing displeasure and
momentary impatience.” Annoying ads create an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff : they may
be more effective for some advertisers, but they are a nuisance for viewers. This tradeoff
challenges media platforms that thrive on advertising, because some advertisers may be
willing to pay more to show more annoying ads. For example, Wall Street analyst Richard
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Greenfield noted that “while larger/more prominent ads clearly detract from the Facebook
user experience, we believe they come with higher CPMs and should help re-accelerate
revenues” (Booton 2012). For mobile platforms such as smart phones and tablets, the stakes
are higher because smaller screens and lower bandwidths make it difficult to show effective
ads, and viewers are less tolerant of annoyance. The proliferation of ad blockers, which pose
an even greater threat to platform profits, is also growing as consumers become less tolerant
of annoying ads.
A platform can partially manage the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff by limiting annoyance
through factors directly under its control, such as ad format or the number of ads on a page.
In 2013, Google reduced the ad load on mobile search by more than 50%. Although this
substantially reduced revenue in the short term, the improved viewer experience led to an
increase of up to 4% in user click-through rates within ten weeks (Hohnhold, O’Brien, and
Tang 2015).
However, ad characteristics that the platform does not directly control, such as ad images
and text, also strongly determine differences in annoyance between ads. This paper focuses on
how platforms can limit ad annoyance that is driven by ad characteristics under advertiser
control. Based on data from Yahoo’s ad feedback tool, characteristics that determine ad
annoyance include how easy it is to read and understand ad text, how reliable users deem
information in the ad to be, symmetry, and aesthetic appeal (Zhou et al. 2016).
Currently, most display advertising platforms use prohibitions to control ad annoyance.
Leading platforms prohibit ads containing violent or offensive subject matter, containing
animations that last more than some number of seconds, and so forth. Unfortunately, under
prohibitions, ads will tend to the allowed limits of annoyance if annoyance is associated with
effectiveness. Also, prohibitions can be difficult to enforce, because some platforms have
limited control over ad content (Lambrecht et al. 2014).
Instead of prohibitions, if advertisers internalize the costs of ad annoyance through a “tax”
for negative ad impact on viewer experience, then advertisers have an incentive to develop
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ads that are less annoying as well as more effective. Abrams and Schwarz (2008) proposed an
auction that charges advertisers for their ads’ impact on viewer experience. The charges are
like Pigovian taxes (Pigou 1912), because advertisers internalize the negative externalities
imposed by their ads. We refer to this pricing mechanism, applied to a single display ad
slot, as the Pigovian second price auction (PSP).
First, PSP subtracts from each advertiser’s bid a charge for the (estimated) reduction
in long-term revenue to the platform that would be caused by showing their ad. Next the
mechanism conducts an auction based on the adjusted bids. The winner is allocated ad
space and pays the adjusted-bid auction price plus the charge for the ad’s impact on user
experience.
Compared to the straightforward second-price auction (SP), PSP increases the sum of
platform revenue and advertiser profit (Abrams and Schwarz 2008). However, when ad
effectiveness and nuisance are positively associated, a scenario not explicitly considered by
Abrams and Schwartz, PSP may increase platform revenue while decreasing advertiser profit.
In other words, the distribution of profits can be skewed. If switching to PSP lowers expected
profits for advertisers, then the platform may suffer in the long term, because advertisers
may shift more of their business to other platforms.
This paper shows that switching from a second-price auction to PSP can simultaneously
improve revenue for advertisers and the platform while improving viewer experience, under
certain marketplace conditions. We show that the bid adjustment for ad impact on user
experience in PSP can benefit advertisers by increasing dispersion among advertiser bids, so
that in PSP the difference between the winning and runner-up adjusted bids is greater on
average than the difference between the winning and runner-up bids from SP. These gaps
are the winning advertiser’s profits under PSP and SP, respectively. Simultaneously, viewers
benefit from a more enjoyable experience, and that enables the platform to benefit from an
increase in future revenue by improving future audience engagement.
A previous paper, by Balachander et al. (2009), also uses a change in dispersion among
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bids to show that a change in auction mechanisms tends to change advertiser prices. That
paper examines a change in second-price auction mechanism from ranking and pricing by
bid times clickthrough rate to ranking and pricing strictly by bid. They show that bids
tend to have less dispersion than bid times clickthrough rates, under the assumption that
bids and clickthrough rates are correlated. Thus, second prices tend to be closer to first
prices, increasing profit for the platform by decreasing profit for advertisers. In contrast,
this paper examines changing the second-price auction mechanism to incorporate a charge
for ad impact on user experience. We show that this change can benefit the platform and
advertisers simultaneously. While the platform benefits from an increase in future revenue by
offering users a more engaging experience, advertiser profits increase because bids adjusted
for ad impact on user experience have more dispersion than bids alone.
Since the relationship between bids and bids adjusted for ad impact on user experience
depends on the strength of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, we explicitly model the trade-
off to study how it impacts profitability for both advertisers and the platform. We model
the strength of the tradeoff by allowing the “hidden cost” of ad annoyance to be associated
with an advertiser’s willingness to pay for a slot. A positive association reflects that more
annoying ads tend to provide a higher value to advertisers. We then apply the model to
show that even in the presence of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, a platform can impose
a charge for annoying ads without compromising the profits earned for itself or by its winning
advertisers.
A key finding is that a higher number of advertisers competing for ad space makes
it more likely that the platform can sustainably charge for ad annoyance (i.e., without
compromising advertiser profits or platform revenues). We derive a formula that relates
the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff to the minimum number of advertisers needed for PSP to
benefit viewers, advertisers, and the platform. The formula shows that even platforms facing
a strong effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff can sustainably implement PSP if they can attract
enough advertisers.
5
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the payoffs to each party under
auction mechanisms with and without a Pigovian charge for ad impact on viewer experience.
Section 3 presents a theorem showing that advertisers can benefit from the Pigovian charge if
they are numerous enough. Section 4 develops a model for the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff
and illustrates the theorem with two examples of joint distributions for ad effectiveness and
nuisance. Section 5 shows that when PSP improves advertiser profits, it also simultaneously
benefits viewers and platform profits. Section 6 analyzes the case in which ad annoyance
and effectiveness are negatively associated instead of positively associated. Section 7 explores
how strategic advertisers choose ads based on auction type and how ad choice affects the
results from previous sections. Finally, Section 8 concludes and proposes directions for future
work.
2. AUCTION MECHANISMS
This section describes the payoffs for the second-price auction (SP) and the Pigovian
second-price (PSP) auction. These descriptions remove some complexity found in actual
auctions for online display ads, such as reserve prices. The bids here are per-impression bids.
In SP, advertisers are ranked by their bids. Let n be the number of bidders, and let
b1, ..., bn be their bids. Let w be the index of the highest bid, and let s be the index of the
second-highest bid. SP allocates the advertising opportunity to advertiser w and charges
this winner the second price: bs.
PSP incorporates measures of the hidden costs of ad annoyance into the pricing and
selection rules. Let z1, ..., zn be measures of the hidden costs imposed on the platform by
showing the ad creatives associated with bids b1, ..., bn. We assume that zi is known to both
advertiser i and the platform.
In practice, platforms can estimate zi through a combination of experimentation and
predictive models of how viewership changes over time as a function of ad features, viewer
engagement metrics, and editorial assessment. See Goldstein et al. (2014) for an example
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on how hidden costs (i.e., a platform’s economic costs of serving annoying display ads to
viewers) can be experimentally measured. Similarly, Hohnhold, O’Brien and Tang (2015)
developed a model to predict long-term user behavior based on short-term user satisfaction
metrics. Platforms, such as Yahoo, Hulu, Facebook and Twitter, often monitor ad impact on
user experience through a variety of methods, including text links that collect ad feedback
from users on the relevance and attractiveness of ads (Rohrer and Boyd 2004).
The PSP mechanism first adjusts offers by subtracting each ad’s annoyance costs from
its bid: b1 − z1, ..., bn − zn. Then it holds a second-price auction using the adjusted offers.
Let ai = bi− zi denote adjusted offers. Let w˜ and s˜ be the indices of the highest and second-
highest adjusted offers, respectively. The winner w˜ is charged the second-highest adjusted
offer plus the hidden cost imposed by the winner’s ad: as˜ + zw˜.
Under both auctions, advertisers bid their private values v1, ..., vn for the opportunity to
advertise. For SP, the auction is truthful because it is a Vickrey auction (Vickrey 1961).
For PSP, advertisers bid b(vi − zi) + zi in equilibrium, where the function b(vi) denotes
an equilibrium bid in a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction (Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971,
Groves 1973, Abrams and Schwartz 2008). Since only one ad opportunity is auctioned,
b(x) = x.
Any advertiser who has a negative valuation for showing their ad, vi < 0, does not enter
a bid in SP, because if they did, then they would risk negative utility should they win and
receive zero utility if they lose. If an advertiser’s adjusted bid is negative, vi − zi < 0, then
PSP removes its adjusted bid from the auction. Define r(x1, x2) = max(x1, 0)−max(x2, 0).
Then the profit for the winning advertiser in SP is r(vw, vs), and the profit for the winning
advertiser in PSP (which may not be the same winner as for SP) is r(aw˜, as˜). This is because
if aw˜ > 0 and as˜ > 0, then the PSP winner is charged as˜ + zw˜, leaving a profit of
vw˜ − as˜ + zw˜ = (vw˜ − zw˜)− as˜ = aw˜ − as˜. (1)
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Table 1 reviews our notation and Table 2 summarizes the outcomes under both auctions.
The price, cost of annoyance, and platform profit formulas assume vw, vs, aw˜, and as˜ are
all nonnegative. The last three outcomes in Table 2 summarize when PSP benefits viewers
(zw˜ > zw), the platform (vs˜ − zs˜ > vs − zw), and advertisers (aw˜ − as˜ > vw − vs).
Table 1: Notation
Notation Definition
vi advertiser’s private value
zi cost of ad’s annoyance to the platform
ai adjusted bid: private value minus annoyance
w, s winner and runner-up indices in SP
w˜, s˜ winner and runner-up indices in PSP
Table 2: Outcomes
Outcome SP PSP
Basis for selection vi vi − zi
Value of slot to winner vw vw˜
Price vs vs˜ − zs˜ + zw˜
Cost of annoyance zw zw˜
Profit for platform vs − zw vs˜ − zs˜
Profit for winning advertiser r(vw, vs) r(vw˜ − zw˜, vs˜ − zs˜)
We conclude this section with a simple example that builds intuition on how PSP can
simultaneously benefit viewers, the platform, and its advertisers. Consider ten advertisers
with valuations (v1, . . . , v10) = (6.04, 5.57, 5.13, 5.11, 4.51, 4.50, 4.39, 4.07, 3.24, 3.02) and
ad impacts on user experience (z1, . . . , z10) = (2.20, 2.67, 5.07, 2.45, 3.42, -0.09, 2.87, 1.82,
2.00, 0.11). Their adjusted bids ai = vi − zi are (a1, . . . , a10) = (3.84, 2.90, 0.06, 2.66, 1.09,
4.59, 1.52, 2.25, 1.24, 2.91). As shown in Figure 1, the respective winner and runner-up are
advertisers one and two for SP, and advertisers six and one for PSP.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Bids
v1v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7v8v9v10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Adjusted bids
a1
a2
a3 a4a5 a6a7 a8a9
a10
Figure 1: A sample of bids and adjusted bids
The data for this example was generated at random using a model we will discuss in
detail in the next section. The values vi were drawn i.i.d. from a normal distribution with
mean five and standard deviation 1. The ad impacts on user experience zi were generated by
adding a quarter of vi to half of a value drawn i.i.d. from a normal distribution with mean
two and standard deviation 2. The first term reflects an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, and
the second term reflects random variation in ad impact on user experience over ads and
advertisers. For ease of illustration, advertisers are ordered by their bids vi.
Viewers, the advertisers as a group, and the platform simultaneously benefit from PSP in
this example. First, note that PSP clearly improves viewer experience: z6 > z1. The winning
ad under SP (advertiser 1) has such a negative impact on user experience that showing it
will eventually decrease views enough for the publisher to lose z1 = 2.20. In contrast, the
winning ad (advertiser 6) under PSP has a positive impact on user experience: z6 = −0.09.
Second, the profits for the platform are also greater for PSP: a1 > v2 − z1. For SP,
the platform receives the second price v2 = 5.57 in immediate revenue from the winning
advertiser, but incurs a z1 = 2.20 eventual reduction in revenue due to the winning ad’s
impact on user experience. Thus, the total platform revenue from SP is 5.57− 2.20 = 3.37.
For PSP, the platform receives from the winning advertiser the runner-up adjusted bid of a1 =
3.84 minus a bonus of z6 = −0.09 for the winning ad’s positive impact on user experience.
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The platform eventually recovers the 0.09 because the positive ad experience drives more
views and hence more revenue in the future. Thus, total platform revenue for PSP is 3.84.
Third, the winning advertiser for PSP is more profitable than the winning advertiser for
SP. Notice that for both auctions, the winning advertiser’s profit is the difference between
the highest and second-highest values from a distribution: for SP, the distribution of offers
vi; for PSP, the distribution of adjusted offers vi−zi. In this example, the difference between
the top two bids is 6.04 − 5.57 = 0.47, while the difference between the top two adjusted
bids is 4.59− 3.84 = 0.75.
The next section formally shows when PSP leads to greater advertiser profits than SP.
Notice from Figure 1 that in this example, adjusted bids are more dispersed than bids. This
greater variance in the distribution of adjusted bids is driven by random variation in ad
impact on user experience zi. A consequence of this dispersion is that PSP adjusted bids
tend to have larger differences between their top two adjusted bids than between the top two
SP bids. If this occurs, then advertiser profit for PSP is greater than for SP, if the runner-up
adjusted bid is also nonnegative. Notice also from Figure 1 that the distribution of adjusted
bids is shifted left from the distribution of bids. This occurs if viewing ads is, on average
over ads, a negative experience for viewers.
An advertiser may have an adjusted bid greater than their bid (i.e., a6 > v6) if their ad
has such a positive impact on user experience that it increases views for the publisher. These
attractive ads are more likely to be shown under PSP than under SP. It is also possible for
an advertiser with a positive bid vi to have a negative adjusted bid. PSP excludes these
advertisers, because their bid does not cover the eventual cost to the publisher in reduced
views from showing the ad. In short, the Pigovian charge drives these ads out of the auction.
3. A THEOREM ON ADVERTISER PROFITS
This section compares total expected profits for advertisers under each auction. The
auctions may have different winning advertisers, but in both cases the advertiser profit
accrues to the winner. Recall from Table 2 that advertiser profit equals the difference
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between the top two offers under SP, and the difference between the top two adjusted offers
under PSP. Also recall that r(x1, x2) = max(x1, 0)−max(x2, 0). Switching from SP to PSP
increases the expected profits for advertisers as a class when:
E{r(aw˜, as˜)} > E{r(vw, vs)}. (2)
In this section, we derive a theorem by comparing these expected profits for a general
set of distributions for bids vi and for adjusted bids ai = vi − zi. In the next section, we
illustrate the theorem using two examples of specific distributions. Let f be the pdf of bids
vi, and let F be the cdf. Then the advertiser surplus for SP can be written:
vw − vs = F−1(F (vw))− F−1(F (vs)). (3)
If f is continuous, then each F (vi) is uniformly distributed over the interval from zero to
one: U [0, 1], under the probability integral transform (David and Nagaraja 2003). The ran-
dom variable F (vw) is the nth order statistic of n uniform random variables: F (v1), ..., F (vn).
This nth order statistic is distributed Beta(n, 1) (David and Nagaraja 2003), so it has mean
n
n+1 . Similarly, F (vs) is the n − 1st order statistic, with distribution Beta(n − 1, 2), and
hence its mean is n−1
n+1 . To approximate the mean of the LHS of Equation 3, use the RHS and
substitute the means of F (vw) and F (vs) for their values. Substituting these means inside a
non-linear function leads to an approximation of the LHS that becomes more accurate as n
increases because the beta distributions become more concentrated around their means2.
E{v − vs} ≈ F−1
(
n
n+ 1
)
− F−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)
. (4)
To analyze advertiser surplus for PSP, let g be the pdf of adjusted bids ai = vi − zi and
let G be the cdf. The expected advertiser surplus can be approximated:
2Our proof does not rely on this approximation; we use it only to simplify this explanation.
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E{aw˜ − as˜} ≈ G−1
(
n
n+ 1
)
−G−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)
. (5)
Equations 4 and 5 show that advertiser surplus is approximately equal to the difference
between F−1
(
n−1
n+1
)
and F−1
(
n
n+1
)
for SP, and approximately equal to the difference between
G−1
(
n−1
n+1
)
and G−1
(
n
n+1
)
for PSP. Consider the following approximation to Inequality 2 :
F−1
(
n
n+ 1
)
− F−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)
< G−1
(
n
n+ 1
)
−G−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)
. (6)
Since F is a cdf, the area under the pdf f from F−1
(
n−1
n+1
)
to F−1
(
n
n+1
)
must equal 1
n+1 .
Equivalently, after dividing the support of f into n + 1 segments, each covered by 1
n+1 of
the area under f , advertiser surplus is the distance covered by the second-to-last segment.
Similarly, the area under g from G−1
(
n−1
n+1
)
to G−1
(
n
n+1
)
must also equal 1
n+1 . These are
illustrated as areas “A” and “B” in Figure 2 for two hypothetical distributions g and f .
as~ aw~ vs vw
f
g
A
B
Figure 2: Advertiser profits under each auction
Since A and B have equal areas (equal to 1
n+1), when the pdf f is higher over B than
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the height of g over A, the length of the base (i.e., advertiser surplus) must be larger for A
than for B, making PSP more profitable than SP. In summary, if the second-to-last segment
supporting 1
n+1 of the area under g covers more distance than the second-to-last segment
supporting 1
n+1 of the area under f , then PSP is favorable for advertisers. Equivalently, a
lower right tail in g than in f makes PSP favorable, given sufficient numbers of competing
advertisers to place F−1( n
n+1), F
−1(n−1
n+1), G
−1( n
n+1), and G
−1(n−1
n+1) out in the right tails of
f and g. We call this the dispersion condition.
The dispersion condition is less likely to hold when there is a strong effectiveness-nuisance
tradeoff in the marketplace. If more annoying ads are more effective for advertisers, then vi
and zi are positively associated. An increase in the association between vi and zi reduces
the variance of adjusted bids, and makes the right tail of g higher. In the extreme case
when vi and zi are directly proportional, PSP harms advertisers. In this case, adjusted bids
vi − zi are simply scaled versions of bids vi; the ranking of the bidders is the same under
each auction, and the same advertiser wins under each. However, the winner under PSP is
charged more, because they are charged for the annoyance of their ad.
If vi and zi are strongly (but not perfectly) positively correlated, then the dispersion
condition can be met if there are enough advertisers participating in the auction. Theorem
1 (proven in Appendix A) shows that when the dispersion condition is met, there exists a
minimum number of bidding advertisers such that the expected profits for the winner are
higher under PSP than under SP.
Theorem 1 Let SP bids vi have a continuous pdf f and cdf F . Let PSP adjusted bids
ai = vi − zi have a continuous pdf g and cdf G. Suppose g has a lower right tail than f ,
in the sense that ∃uˆ < 1 such that ∀u > uˆ : g(G−1(u)) < f(F−1(u)), G−1(uˆ) ≥ 0, and
F−1(uˆ) <∞. Then ∃nˆ(F,G) <∞ such that ∀n ≥ nˆ(F,G) the expected sum of advertisers’
profits from PSP is greater than that for SP: E{r(aw˜, as˜)} > E{r(vw, vs)}.
Now we briefly discuss the long-term implications of implementing PSP, which are dis-
cussed in more detail in Section 7. Since Theorem 1 imposes minimal assumptions on the
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joint distribution of advertiser valuations vi and nuisance costs zi, it can be applied to
evaluate scenarios in which this joint distribution is expected to change. The effectiveness-
nuisance tradeoff in the marketplace (which determines the joint distribution) is not expected
to remain constant over time, but can instead decrease in magnitude because PSP provides
advertisers with incentives to invest in developing ads that are effective without being as
annoying. As advertisers adapt to PSP in the long run, the strength of the tradeoff should
diminish, making the dispersion condition more likely to hold. Visually, when the correlation
between vi and zi decreases, advertiser profits under PSP (i.e., the base of area A in Figure
2) increase because the right tail of g becomes lower while the area over A still equals 1
n+1 .
To summarize, since PSP provides advertisers with incentives to develop better ads,
advertiser profits under PSP are expected to increase over time. Nevertheless, the platform
must ensure that initially (for the given current level of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff)
PSP can benefit its advertisers relative to SP, since platforms compete with each other for
advertisers. Thus, the next section analyzes the implications of implementing PSP for a
given level of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff.
4. A MODEL FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS-NUISANCE TRADEOFF
To illustrate Theorem 1, we apply it to a marketplace with an effectiveness-nuisance
tradeoff in which advertisers with higher bids also tend to be those with ads that are more
annoying. Let an ad’s hidden costs of annoyance zi be a weighted function of scaled bids
(c ≥ 0) and an independent random variable yi:
zi = θcvi + (1− θ)yi (7)
The weight θ ∈ (0, 1), which controls the positive association between vi and zi, is a
measure of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff present in the marketplace. As θ approaches 1,
advertisers with the highest bids tend to have ads with the most annoyance. As θ approaches
zero, vi and zi become independent, so the tradeoff is not present.
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Under this model, the distributions for vi and yi jointly define f (the pdf of bids) and g
(the pdf of adjusted bids). Note that adjusted bids under this model equal
ai = vi − zi = (1− cθ)vi − (1− θ)yi. (8)
Next we apply Theorem 1 to two examples of this model. In Example 1, both vi and yi are
uniformly distributed. In Example 2, both are normally distributed.
4.1 Example 1: vi and yi uniformly distributed
If both vi and yi have uniform distributions over the interval from zero to one, then the
area under f is a square with height one over [0,1], and the area under g is a trapezoid, as
shown in Figure 3. It is the convolution of two uniform distributions. The maximum height
of the trapezoid is 11−cθ , which is greater than one.
If the second-highest adjusted bid is far enough along the right side of the trapezoid that
g(as˜) ≤ 1, then PSP is favorable to SP for advertisers as a class. Visually, where the height
of the uniform f is larger than the height of the trapezoid g over the two largest adjusted
bids, the difference between the two largest adjusted bids must be larger in expectation than
the difference between the two largest bids. Equivalently, if g(x) ≤ 1 for x ∈ [as˜, aw˜], then
g(x) ≤ f(x) over this domain, making PSP favorable to SP.
 
-c(1-θ) 0 1-c 1-cθ 
 
    
 
Figure 3: Density g when vi and yi are correlated and uniformly distributed
This example highlights why, as more advertisers participate, PSP is more likely to
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improve advertiser profits relative to SP. Recall areas A and B from Figure 2. Since the
areas of A and B are equal, the area with the lower height must also have a longer base. The
length of the base is equal to the profits made by the winning advertiser.
In this example, bids have a uniform distribution f in the shape of a square with a height
equal to 1, while adjusted bids have a distribution g in the shape of a trapezoid (with a height
greater than 1). If few advertisers participate, then it is likely that the top two adjusted
bids are near the middle of the trapezoid (where the height of g is greater than 1). As more
advertisers participate, the top two adjusted bids are more likely to fall further out into the
right tail of the trapezoid, where the height of the pdf g is less than one (i.e., the zone in
which PSP leads to greater advertiser profits than SP).
Next we calculate how many participating advertisers n are needed at a minimum for the
expected second-highest adjusted bid to be far enough along the right side of the trapezoid
so that g(as˜) ≤ 1. Using the approximation from Equation 5, this condition is approximately
the same as
g
(
G−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
))
< 1.
To solve for n, note that s∗ = (1 − cθ)θ is the point at which g(s∗) = 1. The above
inequality holds when
G−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)
≥ s∗
or, equivalently,
n− 1
n+ 1 ≥ G(s
∗).
The area under g from s∗ to the right end of the distribution can be written as 1-G(s∗).
This area is a triangle of height 1 and length (1− cθ)(1− θ), so G(s∗) = 1− 12(1− cθ)(1− θ).
To find approximately how many advertisers are needed for PSP to be favorable to SP for
advertisers as a class, set this equal to n−1
n+1 and solve for n:
n ≥ 2(1− cθ)(1− θ) − 1. (9)
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This lower bound increases as the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff increases (as θ → 1). As
θ → 1, the sides of the trapezoid become steeper and cover less horizontal distance, making
the trapezoid resemble a rectangle. The next example calculates a lower bound for n when
vi and yi are normally distributed.
4.2 Example 2: vi and yi normally distributed
Let vi and yi be normally distributed as shown in Equations 10 and 11.
vi ∼ N(µv, σ2v) (10)
yi ∼ N(µy, σ2y) (11)
Then the distribution of bids f is normal (Equation 10), and the distribution of adjusted
bids g is also normal, with mean µa = (1− cθ)µv− (1− θ)µy and variance σ2a = (1− cθ)2σ2v +
(1 − θ)2σ2y. These two distributions are positively associated through the weight θ, which
controls the strength of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff.
Using the normal model, we first show that Theorem 1 is satisfied by uˆ = G(0) when the
distribution of adjusted bids is more dispersed than the distribution of bids: σa > σv. Then
we use uˆ = G(0) to estimate a lower bound on the number of advertisers needed for PSP to
benefit advertisers as a class when σa > σv. We conclude by explaining how the magnitude
of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff parameter θ affects the condition σa > σv.
4.2.1 Theorem 1 is satisfied by uˆ = G(0) when σa > σv.
Theorem 1 requires uˆ such that 1. ∀u ≥ uˆ : g(G−1(u)) < f(F−1(u)), 2. G−1(uˆ) ≥ 0
and 3. F−1(uˆ) < ∞. For the first condition, recall that any normal distribution cdf can be
written in terms of the standard normal cdf Φ. For example,
F (x) = Φ
(
x− µv
σv
)
.
Set u = F (x) and F−1(u) = x. Then solve for F−1(u):
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F−1(u) = µv + Φ−1(u)σv. (12)
Recall that the pdf for a normal variable with mean µv and standard deviation σv is
f(x) = 1√
2piσv
e−
1
2(x−µvσv )
2
. (13)
Substitute x = F−1(u) and Equation 12 into Equation 13:
f(F−1(u)) = 1√
2piσv
e−
1
2 [Φ−1(u)].
Similarly,
g(G−1(u)) = 1√
2piσa
e−
1
2 [Φ−1(u)].
So
∀u ∈ (0, 1) : g(G−1(u)) = σv
σa
f(F−1(u)).
As a result, g(G−1(u)) < f(F−1(u)) if and only if σa > σv, and this holds for all u ∈ (0, 1).
To meet the second condition, G−1(uˆ) ≥ 0, set uˆ = G(0). This also satisfies the third
condition, F−1(uˆ) < ∞, assuming µv, σv, µa, and σa are finite. So for normal f and g,
Theorem 1 is satisfied by uˆ = G(0) if σa > σv.
4.2.2 Estimated lower bound on number of advertisers needed when σa > σv
Now we use uˆ = G(0) to analyze how many advertisers are needed for PSP to benefit
advertisers as a class when σa > σv. Setting uˆ = G(0) means that PSP benefits advertisers
when the runner-up adjusted bid is nonnegative: as˜ ≥ 0. Because E {G(as˜)} = n−1n+1 , the
number of advertisers needed is about n such that
G(0) = n− 1
n+ 1 .
Since G is the cdf of a normal distribution with mean µa and standard deviation σa,
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G(0) ≡ Pr {g ≤ 0} = Φ(−µa
σa
). So the number of advertisers required is about
n = 21− Φ(−µa
σa
) − 1 =
2
Φ(µa
σa
) − 1.
We can use the standard normal cdf, with µa
σa
as the Z-score, to find Φ(µa
σa
). For example,
if µa
σa
≈ −1, then about 12 advertisers are needed for the expected value of the runner-up
adjusted bid to be nonnegative:
n = 2Φ(−1) − 1 ≈ 12.
In this case, the charge for ad annoyance makes average adjusted bids negative, but the
standard deviation of adjusted bids makes the probability of each bid being nonnegative
about 16% (i.e., the probability of a standard normal being at least one standard deviation
above its mean). For µa
σa
≈ −2, about 90 advertisers are needed. In contrast, if µa
σa
≈ 0, then
about half of adjusted bids are nonnegative, and three advertisers are needed.
To compare the magnitude of the figures from this example with actual display auc-
tions, we refer to summary statistics from a random sample of second-price auctions from
a leading online display advertising platform, Microsoft Advertising Exchange. Celis et al.
(2014) report a summary distribution of the number of participating advertisers through
approximately 83,500 second-price auctions. The mean and median number of advertisers
per auction is 6, with a standard deviation of 3, and a maximum of 15. In practice, the
number of bidding advertisers for each display slot can vary day-to-day across platforms
and types of slots. The ability to target consumers through information on their preferences
can reduce the number of advertisers that are interested for a slot. Our findings suggest
that platforms should implement the Pigovian tax for competitive ad slots that consistently
attract a large group of bidders, rather than for ad slots with thinner markets.
4.2.3 The role of effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff parameter θ
Since σ2a = (1 − cθ)2σ2v + (1 − θ)2σ2y, the inequality σa > σv, needed to satisfy Theorem
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1, holds when
σy >
√
1− (1− cθ)2
1− θ σv. (14)
As θ approaches its upper limit, Inequality 14 does not hold, because setting θ = 1 makes
the denominator zero. Thus, PSP will not benefit advertisers when the costs of annoyance
are directly proportional to effectiveness: zi = cvi. The inequality holds when there is no
tradeoff, because setting θ = 0 makes the numerator equal to zero.
For intermediate cases, 0 < θ < 1, Inequality 14 holds if the independent component
of zi, which is (1 − θ)yi, boosts the standard deviation of adjusted bids more than the
proportional component, cθvi, shrinks it. Once σa becomes larger than σv, PSP becomes
more advantageous for advertisers if there are a sufficient number of them to have nonnegative
runner-up and winning bids.
5. VIEWER EXPERIENCE AND PLATFORM PROFIT
This section shows how PSP benefits the platform and viewers. The platform operates in a
two-sided market: it offers content to attract viewers, and it offers advertisers an opportunity
to advertise to the audience. The platform must ensure that a switch to PSP benefits the
entire marketplace: advertiser profits (discussed in previous sections), viewer experience,
and platform profits.
5.1 Viewer experience
PSP is designed to improve viewer welfare because it selects advertisements that lead to
a better viewer experience. PSP improves (or at least preserves) viewer experience on an
auction-by-auction basis (Theorem 2), and it decreases the expected costs of ad annoyance
(Theorem 3).
Theorem 2. Switching from SP to PSP improves (or at least preserves) viewer experi-
ence by reducing the costs of ad annoyance: zw˜ ≤ zw.
Proof. By the definition of w˜, vw − zw ≤ vw˜ − zw˜, which implies zw˜ ≤ zw − (vw − vw˜).
By the definition of w, vw ≥ vw˜. Hence the term in parenthesis is positive, proving that
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zw ≥ zw˜. 
Theorem 3. If ad annoyance costs to the platform are not perfectly correlated with
advertiser valuations (θ < 1), then switching from SP to PSP decreases the hidden costs of
ad annoyance in expectation: E{zw˜} < E{zw}.
Proof. From Theorem 2, zw˜ ≤ zw. Thus we only need to show that Pr{zw˜ = zw} < 1.
Since zi are drawn i.i.d. from some continuous distribution, zi values for different advertisers
i have a zero probability of being equal: Pr{zi = zj} = 0 ∀i 6= j. Hence, we only need to
show that the auctions sometimes pick different winners: Pr{w˜ = w} < 1, or equivalently,
Pr{w˜ 6= w} > 0, which is true when vi and zi are not perfectly correlated. 
5.2 Platform profits
Recall from Table 2 that the platform’s profits from SP are vs − zw and from PSP are
vs˜−zs˜. PSP leads to greater profits because it allows the platform to select better ads and to
charge advertisers for annoyance costs. In other words, it selects ads based on total revenue
for the platform vi − zi, while SP selects ads only based on bids vi.
Two extreme cases of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, θ = 1 and θ = 0, provide
further intuition. If θ = 1, the most annoying ads are also the most effective, and vi and
zi are perfectly correlated. To illustrate, suppose that zi = cvi for a constant c≥ 0. Both
auctions produce the same ranking of advertiser offers, but the platform’s profits are greater
under PSP because it charges the winner a premium for its ad’s impact on user experience.
When there is no effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff (θ = 0), then zi and vi are independent.
In this case, PSP also improves platform profits because the runner up in PSP is likely to
have both a high private value vi and low annoyance zi. As the number of bidding advertisers
increases to infinity, the runner up almost surely has one of the highest private values for
the slot and one of the least annoying ads. Consequently, PSP is likely to reduce annoyance
costs while maintaining a high ad price.
The following theorem states that PSP produces at least as much expected revenue for
the platform as SP.
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Theorem 4. Switching from SP to PSP is expected to improve (or at least preserve)
platform profits: ∀θ ∈ [0, 1], c ≥ 0, and n ≥ 3, E{vs˜ − zs˜} ≥ E{vs − zw}.
See Appendix B for the formal proof. The theorem focuses on the normal distribution
example, but it is easy to see that it also applies to the uniform distribution example and
to other symmetric distributions. The theorem assumes two or more nonnegative bids and
adjusted bids. If there is only one positive bid, then SP platform revenue is −zw, because it
incurs the ad impact on user experience and shows the ad for no charge. If there is only one
positive adjusted bid, then PSP platform revenue is zero, because it charges only for the ad
impact on user experience.
This section has shown that when there is an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, PSP gen-
erally improves platform profits and viewer experience. Previous sections showed that ad-
vertisers only benefit from PSP if enough of them participate in the auction. So, in general,
PSP can simultaneously benefit the marketplace (viewer experience, advertiser profit, and
platform profit) when advertisers benefit as a class.
6. ATTRACTIVE ADS
Thus far, we have compared PSP to SP for models with an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff
in which ads tend to have annoyance associated with the value to the advertiser to show the
ad. But this need not be the case. Some platforms may not face the effectiveness-nuisance
tradeoff and may instead observe that advertisers with more attractive ads tend to have a
higher willingness to pay.
This section considers the case in which annoyance is negatively associated with value.
In this section, we will use the term attractiveness to mean the opposite of annoyance:
attractiveness equals −zi, and we will say that an ad is attractive if −zi > 0, (i.e., if the ad
increases future views for the platform instead of imposing hidden nuisance costs).
The next two subsections show that under these circumstances PSP can also benefit both
advertisers and the platform, because it selects ads that are both attractive and effective.
The exception is the extreme case in which attractiveness and willingness-to-pay are perfectly
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(or very highly) correlated: then SP and PSP both select the most attractive ad, but the
same advertiser is compensated more under PSP for the ad’s attractiveness.
6.1 Advertisers benefit from attractive ads
PSP gives attractive ads an advantage in the auction and a credit based on attractiveness:
the advertiser’s bid vi is boosted by −zi to form the adjusted bid. If that bid wins the
auction, then the advertiser is charged the runner-up adjusted bid minus the −zi boost. If
the advertiser with the greatest value for showing their ad also has the most attractive ad,
then PSP gives that advertiser a price break compared to SP. In general, if attractiveness
is independent of or positively associated with value, then the winning advertiser benefits
on average, due to dispersion. To see this, alter the normal model from Section 4.2 to have
attractiveness (rather than annoyance) positively associated with value, by replacing
zi = θcvi + (1− θ)yi (15)
with
zi = −[θcvi + (1− θ)yi]. (16)
The term θ now controls the association between ad attractiveness and value. Recall that
adjusted bids are ai = vi − zi, so the mean and variance of the distribution of adjusted bids
are
µa = (1 + cθ)µv + (1− θ)µy (17)
and
σ2a = (1 + cθ)2σ2v + (1− θ)2σ2y . (18)
From Subsection 4.2.1, Theorem 1 is satisfied by uˆ = G(0) if the dispersion of PSP’s adjusted
bids is greater than the dispersion of SP’s bids: σa > σv. To see that this condition is
satisfied, examine the two terms on the right-hand side of Equation 18. Note that the first
term (1 + cθ)2σ2v > σ2v (because c and θ are both greater than zero) and the second term is
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non-negative ((1− θ)2σ2y ≥ 0), so σa > σv.
6.2 Platform profits and attractive ads
Now consider whether the platform benefits from PSP if ad attractiveness (−zi) is pos-
itively associated with the value to the advertiser for showing the ad (vi). Under SP the
platform benefits from the attractiveness of the winning ad without compensating the ad-
vertiser for it. Under PSP, though, the platform compensates the winning advertiser for the
difference in attractiveness between the winning ad and the runner-up ad.
In the extreme case that attractiveness and value are perfectly correlated, PSP harms
platform profit because it selects the same attractive ad but compensates the advertiser for
its attractiveness. In this case, s˜ = s, so platform profit under PSP equals SP platform profit
minus the difference in attractiveness between the top two ads (recall Table 2):
vs˜ − zs˜ = vs − zw + (zw − zs). (19)
However, if attractiveness is not directly proportional to value (i.e., the most highly-
valued ad need not be the most attractive), then PSP can benefit the platform because it
may select an ad that offers the publisher a greater sum of bid value and attractiveness
than the ad selected by SP. We illustrate this using the normal model from Section 4.2,
with the change in sign for zi to have attractiveness (instead of annoyance) associated with
value (Equation 16). Specifically, we find an approximate condition for PSP to provide the
platform with greater expected profits than SP: E {vs˜ − zs˜} > E {vs − zw}.
First some notation. Let E
{
N (µ, σ2)(k,n)
}
be the expected value of the kth greatest
value among n i.i.d. draws from the distribution N (µ, σ2). Then, PSP platform profit is
E {vs˜ − zs˜} = E
{
N ((1 + cθ)µv + (1− θ)µy, (1 + cθ)2σ2v + (1− θ)2σ2y)(2,n)
}
. (20)
Since −zw = θcvw + (1− θ)yw, and yw is independent of the ranking by bid to select w, the
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inequality
E {vs˜ − zs˜} > E {vs − zw} (21)
is equivalent to
E
{
N ((1 + cθ)µv + (1− θ)µy, (1 + cθ)2σ2v + (1− θ)2σ2y)(2,n)
}
> E
{
N (µv, σ2v)(2,n)
}
+ cθE
{
N (µv, σ2v)(1,n)
}
+ (1− θ)µy. (22)
To approximate this inequality, approximate each expectation of an order statistic by
the inverse cdf of the expected cdf value, which is n−k+1
n+1 for the kth order statistic out of
n samples (David and Nagaraja 2003). For our normal distributions, this approximation is
shown in Equation 23.
E
{
N (µ, σ2)(k,n)
}
≈ µ+ Φ−1
(
n− k + 1
n+ 1
)
σ. (23)
Under this approximation, the inequality becomes
(1 + cθ)µv + (1− θ)µy + Φ−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)√
(1 + cθ)2σ2v + (1− θ)2σ2y (24)
> µv + Φ−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)
σv + cθµv + cθΦ−1
(
n
n+ 1
)
σv + (1− θ)µy.
Cancel (1 + cθ)µv + (1− θ)µy from both sides and combine terms:
Φ−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)√
(1 + cθ)2σ2v + (1− θ)2σ2y >
[
Φ−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)
+ cθΦ−1
(
n
n+ 1
)]
σv. (25)
For 0 < θ < 1, the inequality holds if σy is sufficiently large:
σ2y >
[
1 + cθΦ
−1( nn+1)
Φ−1(n−1n+1)
]2
− (1 + cθ)2
(1− θ)2 σ
2
v . (26)
As previously discussed, in the extreme case when θ = 1 (attractiveness is directly propor-
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tional to value) the inequality does not hold. When attractiveness is independent of value
(θ = 0) the inequality holds for any σy > 0:
Φ−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)√
σ2v + σ2y > Φ−1
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)
σv. (27)
7. STRATEGIC ADVERTISERS
Advertisers tend to have multiple ads available to submit to online advertising auctions.
In this section, we consider how advertisers’ ability to choose an ad to submit based on
whether the auction mechanism is SP or PSP affects the results from the previous sections.
Allowing advertisers to be strategic increases the dispersion of PSP adjusted bids, which
reduces the minimum number of advertisers needed for the Pigovian tax to increase advertiser
profits.
We first show that advertisers choose to submit their highest-value ad for SP and their
highest adjusted-value ad for PSP. Consequently, we can apply results from the previous
sections if we substitute the distribution of values of the highest-value ads (per advertiser) for
the distribution of advertisers’ values for ads, and we substitute the distribution of adjusted
bids of the highest adjusted-bid ads (per advertiser) for the distribution of adjusted bids.
Finally, we discuss how the substituted distributions can vary from the distributions used for
the earlier results, affecting dispersion and hence advertiser profitability, when advertisers
choose ads based on the auction type.
Let us begin with new notation that is summarized in Table 3. We will continue to use
i to index advertisers, and we will also use j to index an advertiser’s ads. Let vij be the
value to advertiser i for showing their ad j. Let zij be the ad’s impact on user experience,
and let aij = vij − zij be the ad’s adjusted bid. For an advertiser i, let j∗ index the ad with
maximum value and let j˜ index an ad with maximum adjusted bid.
The following two lemmas outline how advertisers select which ad to submit based on
the auction type. We assume advertisers’ ad values and impacts on user experience are
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Table 3: Notation for strategic advertisers
Notation Definition
vij advertiser i’s value for ad j
j∗ index of max{vij} for advertiser i
j˜ index of max{aij} for advertiser i
v∗i , z
∗
i , a
∗
i characteristics of j∗ (ad that i chooses for SP)
v˜i, z˜i, a˜i characteristics of j˜ (ad that i chooses for PSP)
drawn at random. The lemmas allow different distributions of ad values and impacts on user
experience for different advertisers.
Lemma 1 For the SP auction, each advertiser maximizes their expected profit by sub-
mitting a highest-value ad from the advertiser’s set of ads.
Proof. This is a proof by contradiction. Suppose advertiser i submits an ad j that has
less than the maximum value among advertiser i’s ads: vij < v∗ij, and that maximizes their
expected profit. Instead, the advertiser could submit a maximum-value ad and use the same
bid as the advertiser used for ad j. Since the advertiser uses the same bid, their probability
of winning and price if they win are the same. But if they win, then they receive v∗ij−vij > 0
more value. 
Lemma 2 For the PSP auction, each advertiser maximizes their expected profit by sub-
mitting a highest adjusted-bid ad from the advertiser’s set of ads, assuming the advertiser
has an ad with positive adjusted bid.
Proof. We will also prove this lemma by contradiction. Suppose advertiser i submits an
ad j that has aij < aij˜, bids b, and that maximizes the advertiser’s expected profit. Instead,
the advertiser could submit ad j˜ and bid b− zij + zij˜. The advertiser would have the same
adjusted bid, because (b − zij + zij˜) − zij˜ = b − zij. So the advertiser would have the same
probability of winning the auction. Let s be the adjusted bid for the second-place offer,
or zero if that adjusted bid is negative. If the advertiser wins with ad j, then their profit
is vij − (s + zij) = aij − s. If the advertiser won with ad j˜, then their profit would be
vij˜ − (s+ zij˜) = aij˜ − s. Since aij˜ > aij, profit would be greater using ad j˜ than ad j. 
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We now prove a theorem that is similar to Theorem 1, but which applies to strategic
advertisers choosing from a set of ads. As in previous sections, let w and s index the winning
and second-place advertisers for SP, and let w˜ and s˜ index the winning and second-place
advertisers for PSP. As shown in Table 3, let v∗i , z∗i , and a∗i be the value, ad impact on user
experience, and adjusted bid (a∗i = v∗i − z∗i ) for the ad that advertiser i chooses for SP. Let
v˜i, z˜i, and a˜i be the value, ad impact on user experience, and adjusted bid (a˜i = v˜i − z˜i) for
the ad that advertiser i chooses for PSP.
Theorem 5 Let the distribution of v∗i have have a continuous pdf f ∗ and cdf F ∗. Let
the distribution of a˜i have a continuous pdf g˜ and cdf G˜. Suppose g˜ has a lower right tail
than f ∗, in the sense that ∃uˆ < 1 such that ∀u > uˆ: gˆ(G˜−1(u)) < f ∗(F ∗−1(u)), G˜−1(uˆ) ≥ 0,
and F ∗−1(uˆ) < ∞. Then ∃nˆ(F ∗, G˜) < ∞ such that ∀n ≥ nˆ(F ∗, G˜) the expected sum of
advertisers’ profits from PSP is greater than for SP: E{r(a˜w˜, a˜s˜)} > E{r(v∗w, v∗s)}.
Proof. As discussed in Section 2, SP and PSP are truthful auctions, so advertisers bid v∗i
in SP and have adjusted bids a˜i in PSP. The remainder of the proof is the proof of Theorem
1, with v∗i , f ∗, F ∗, a˜i, g˜, and G˜ substituted for vi, f , F , ai, g, and G, respectively. 
In general, if g˜ is more dispersed than f ∗ and there is a sufficient number of advertisers
bidding, then PSP increases advertiser profit over SP. Note that before deciding whether
to implement PSP, a platform does not observe the distribution of available advertisements,
and thus does not directly observe g˜. For comparison to the results in earlier sections, we can
treat v∗i as equivalent to vi, and we can consider f ∗ = f . However, in general, the distribution
of adjusted bids will not be the same with vs. without advertiser choice: g˜ 6= g. In other
words, a˜i (the highest adjusted bid for advertiser i) will not have the same distribution as
ai (the adjusted bid of i’s highest value ad). Note that ai = a∗i = v∗i − z∗i .
In the model in Section 4, z∗i is allowed to have some dependence on v∗i . We showed that
subtracting z∗i from v∗i produces adjusted bids with greater dispersion than the original bids
if there are enough bidders. If advertisers can choose a different ad for PSP than the highest-
bid ad they choose for SP, then instead of variation in a∗i − v∗i = −z∗i without advertiser
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choice, with advertiser choice, the results rely on variation in a˜i−v∗i = (a˜i−a∗i )− (a∗i −v∗i ) =
−z∗i + (a˜i − a∗i ). The additional term a˜i − a∗i is the maximum amount that advertiser i can
increase their adjusted bid by switching to a different ad for PSP than the one they would
choose for SP. The term cannot be negative, since the advertiser has the option to use the
same ad for both SP and PSP.
Consider an auction with two bidders, advertisers 1 and 2. Suppose advertiser 1 has value
v∗i = 1 and advertiser 2 has value v∗2 = 1.20. They bid those values in SP, and advertiser wins
with a 0.20 profit. Suppose their highest-value ads have equal impact on user experience:
z∗1 = z∗2 = 0.30. For PSP without strategic ad choices, the adjusted bids are a∗1 = 0.70 and
a∗2 = 0.90, and again advertiser 2 wins with a 0.20 profit.
Now consider the effects of strategic ad choices. Given some values of a˜2 and a˜1 (the
adjusted bids for the ads chosen for PSP by advertisers two and one), if a˜2 − a∗2 > a˜1 − a∗1,
then advertiser 2 increases their profit beyond 0.20. Note that a˜i−a∗i = (v˜i−v∗i )−(z˜i−z∗i ), so
a˜2−a∗2 represents advertiser 2’s flexibility to give up some value, v˜2−v∗2 < 0, to gain more in
the adjusted bid by improving user impact by −(z˜2−z∗2) > 0. In general, if without strategic
choice, PSP winning advertisers have more of this flexibility than runner-up advertisers, then
strategic ad choice will increase their PSP profits. Also, if there are more advertisers and
more variation in this flexibility over advertisers, then that variation will drive increased
profits for strategic choice in the same way that variation in ad impact drives increased
profits from SP to PSP -- by increasing dispersion.
Given a joint distribution for v∗i , z∗i , and a˜i − a∗i , we can build a model as we did in
Section 4 for a joint distribution over v∗i and z∗i , determine the conditions for a˜i to have
more dispersion than v∗i , and apply Theorem 5 to show that PSP benefits advertisers under
those conditions. We will start with the model from Section 4, identify v∗i with vi in that
model, and consider how to alter the terms for z∗i so that they describe the distribution
of z∗i − (a˜i − a∗i ) instead. Of course, if a˜i − a∗i = 0 for all advertisers (i.e., if advertisers’
highest-value ads are also their highest adjusted-bid ads), then the model from Section 4
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needs no adjustments for advertiser choice.
If we model the difference in adjusted values due to ad choice by a constant: a˜i − a∗i =
d > 0, then the model in Equation 8 becomes
a˜i = v∗i − z∗i + (a˜i − a∗i ) = (1− cθ)vi − (1− θ)yi + d.
The constant d moves the distribution of a˜i to the right compared to that of a∗i (i.e., g˜ is g
shifted to the right). The distribution of v∗i the same as that of vi, so f ∗ = f . Under the
shift, g˜(G˜−1(u)) = g(G−1(u)), so the lower right tail condition remains the same.
For the normal version of the model, following the logic from Subsection 4.2.1, Theorem
5 is satisfied by u = G˜(0) if σa > σv. With a shift to the right, G˜(0) < G(0), so fewer
advertisers (or the same number) are needed for PSP to benefit advertisers on average. In
short, the gain in adjusted bids due to the ability to choose among ads can only increase
the number of advertisers with positive adjusted bids, so it can only increase participation
in PSP.
Now suppose a˜i−a∗i is random per advertiser: a˜i−a∗i = di. The random variable di must
be bounded below by zero, since a˜i ≥ a∗i . For simplicity, assume the distribution of di has
positive mean, is symmetric and smooth over its range, and has a zero or negative second
derivative over its range. For now, assume di is independent of both v∗i and z∗i . The model
becomes
a˜i = v∗i − z∗i + (a˜i − a∗i ) = (1− cθ)vi − (1− θ)yi + di.
Adding di makes the distribution of a˜i flatter than the distribution of a∗i in addition to
shifting it to the right. (The distribution of a˜i is the convolution of the distributions of a∗i
and di.) As a result, adjusted bids in PSP have more dispersion when advertisers can select
ads strategically.
When di is not independent of v∗i and z∗i , dispersion will tend to increase if di tends to
increase with v∗i . This models a scenario in which choice allows the rich to get richer: adver-
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tisers with higher highest-value ads can choose alternative ads that improve ad impact more
per unit decrease in value, that give up more value in exchange for even more improvement
in ad impact, or both. Similarly, dispersion will tend to increase if di tends to increase as z∗i
increases. This corresponds to a scenario in which advertisers who rely on ad nuisance for ad
effectiveness are less likely to be able to maintain ad effectiveness while decreasing nuisance.
8. CONCLUSION
This article examined an auction mechanism that charges advertisers a Pigovian tax for
the economic costs to the publisher of ad annoyance. The Pigovian second price auction
(PSP) adds a charge to the second price (SP) auction for the costs of negative ad impact
on viewer experience to the publisher and selects among bids that are adjusted for this
charge. The charge is analogous to a Pigovian tax because advertisers internalize the costs
of negative ad impact on viewer experience.
While PSP can align advertiser and viewer incentives, a platform may be hesitant to
implement it because the Pigovian charge may decrease the profits of its advertisers. But
this not need be the case. This article analyzed conditions for PSP to reduce ad annoyance
without reducing expected advertiser profits.
We developed a general model of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff. One advantage of
the model is that it imposes minimal assumptions on the joint distribution of advertiser
valuations and nuisance costs. Properties of order statistics were applied to compare the
outcomes of PSP and SP.
We found that when enough advertisers are willing to bid for an ad slot, PSP can im-
prove the quality of ads without reducing expected advertiser profits. When PSP benefits
advertisers, then the platform’s own expected profits and the viewer experience also improve.
We also discussed how the model can assess long-term outcomes as advertisers develop ads
that are more effective and less annoying, and found that when advertisers can strategically
select ads in response to the auction type, this reduces the number of advertisers required
for PSP to improve the marketplace.
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We also showed how to estimate how many advertisers must bid for PSP to simultaneously
improve viewer experience, platform profits, and advertiser profits. For example, when
the underlying distributions of the effectiveness-nuisance model are characterized through
linked normal distributions, as presented in Section 4.2, a Z-score statistic can be used to
estimate the minimum number of advertisers required to implement PSP to the benefit
of the marketplace. The Z-score varies with advertiser valuations, ad nuisance costs, and
the association between them. Our findings suggest that platforms should implement the
Pigovian tax for competitive ad slots that consistently attract a large group of bidders, rather
than for ad slots with thinner markets.
We outline two avenues for future research. The first is to examine the implications
of implementing PSP under platform competition. Since we found that the advertisers of a
single platform benefit from PSP when there are enough bidders, suppose that only the most
competitive platforms initially adopt PSP, while smaller platforms with fewer advertisers do
not. Since PSP profitably improves viewer experience and attracts the best advertisers, then,
for the larger platforms, switching to PSP would expand their lead over smaller competitors,
and advertisers would face greater incentives to improve their ads. The marketplace dynam-
ics of platform competition may also be influenced by long-run objectives such as growing
the viewer base or discouraging viewers from adopting ad blocking technologies.
The second avenue is to investigate the role of ad annoyance that is controlled by plat-
forms rather than advertisers. For example, some platforms choose to sell ad formats that
are obtrusive to viewers but can sell at higher prices. In the long run, this strategy may
encourage more consumers to adopt ad-blocking technologies that pose an even greater threat
to platform profits than the nuisance costs of annoying ads.
We conclude by emphasizing the importance and urgency of researching how to address
the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, a challenge for monetizing digital advertising. Managing
this tradeoff is especially critical in the growing industry of mobile display advertising, in
which ads can interfere with user experience because of lower bandwidths and smaller screens.
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As Forbes magazine observes, “users find mobile ads invasive and annoying - even more so
than desktop ads which are easier to tune out. And as Facebook sees its user growth and
engagement slow (particularly with younger users looking elsewhere) it needs to be careful
not to do anything to hasten the exits” (Kosner 2012). Viewers in the mobile market have
more leverage because they drive app adoption and are more likely to generate content for
others to view. Similarly, hardware platforms are also sensitive to negative ad impact, and
have even banned some apps (or their advertisements) based on negative impact on viewer
experience. For example, Apple initially prohibited all ads on some popular apps including
YouTube to encourage adoption of the iPad (Efrati 2012), and more recently Apple released
an iOS9 operating system that allows ad-blocking software.
This study illustrated how to sustainably manage the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff of
online display ads through a Pigovian pricing mechanism. Promoting a better ad experience
for users may be part of a sustainable solution, avoiding a cat-and-mouse game of increasingly
sophisticated ad blockers chasing increasingly sophisticated ways to embed ads in content
or have ads masquerade as content. We hope our findings encourage future work on how to
improve monetization through digital display ads in ways that improve the digital experience
for viewers.
APPENDIX A: Proof of Theorem 1
Let r(x1, x2) = max(x1, 0)−max(x2, 0). Then the advertiser profit from PSP is r(aw˜, as˜),
and the advertiser profit from SP is r(vw, vs). To prove the theorem, we will show that
E {r(aw˜, as˜)} − E {r(vw, vs)} > 0. (28)
To begin, we will transform E {r(vw, vs)} and E {r(aw˜, as˜)} into integrals that are easy
to compare. By definition,
E {r(vw, vs)} =
ˆ ∞
x1=−∞
ˆ x1
x2=−∞
r(x1, x2)q(x1, x2) dx1 dx2 , (29)
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where q(x1, x2) is the joint pdf for the maximum (x1) and runner up (x2) among n i.i.d.
samples from a distribution having pdf f and cdf F . Since there are
(
n
2
)
ways to choose the
top two samples and 2 ways to choose which is the maximum,
q(x1, x2) = 2
(
n
2
)
F (x2)n−2f(x1)f(x2). (30)
Substitute into Equation 29:
E {r(vw, vs)} =
ˆ ∞
x1=−∞
ˆ x1
x2=−∞
r(x1, x2)2
(
n
2
)
F (x2)n−2f(x1) dx1 f(x2) dx2 . (31)
Use two changes of variables: u1 = F (x1) and u2 = F (x2). Since dudx1 = f(x1), du =
f(x1) dx1 . Likewise, du2 = f(x2) dx2 . Then
E {r(vw, vs)} =
ˆ 1
u1=0
ˆ u1
u2=0
r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2))2
(
n
2
)
un−22 du1 du2 . (32)
Let
p(u1, u2) = 2
(
n
2
)
un−22 . (33)
(This is the joint pdf for the maximum and runner up among n i.i.d. samples from U [0, 1].)
Then
E {r(vw, vs)} =
ˆ 1
u1=0
ˆ u1
u2=0
r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2))p(u1, u2) du1 du2 . (34)
Applying the same process to E {r(aw˜, as˜)}, but with variable substitutions u1 = G(x1) and
u2 = G(x2):
E {r(aw˜, as˜)} =
ˆ 1
u1=0
ˆ u1
u2=0
r(G−1(u1), G−1(u2))p(u1, u2) du1 du2 . (35)
Combine the integrals for E {r(vw, vs)} and E {r(aw˜, as˜)}:
E {r(aw˜, as˜)} − E {r(vw, vs)} (36)
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=
ˆ 1
u1=0
ˆ u1
u2=0
[r(G−1(u1), G−1(u2))− r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2))]p(u1, u2) du1 du2 . (37)
Split the integral based on whether u2 ≥ uˆ:
=
ˆ uˆ
u2=0
ˆ 1
u1=u2
[r(G−1(u1), G−1(u2))− r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2))]p(u1, u2) du1 du2 (38)
+
ˆ 1
u2=uˆ
ˆ 1
u1=u2
[r(G−1(u1), G−1(u2))− r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2))]p(u1, u2) du1 du2 . (39)
Call the first double integral I and the second double integral II. First, we will show that
I can be made arbitrarily close to zero by selecting n sufficiently large. Then we will show
that II is positive.
Note that
I ≥ Pr {u2 ≤ uˆ} min
u2≤uˆ,u1≥u2
{r(G−1(u1), G−1(u2))− r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2))}. (40)
Recall that E {u2} = n−1n+1 , and u2 ∈ [0, 1]. By Markov’s Inequality,
Pr {u2 ≤ uˆ} = Pr {1− u2 ≥ 1− uˆ} ≤ E {1− u2}1− uˆ =
2
n+1
1− uˆ . (41)
Since uˆ < 1, 1− uˆ > 0. So we can make Pr {u2 ≤ uˆ} arbitrarily close to zero by choosing n
sufficiently large. To show that we can make I arbitrarily close to zero, we also need to show
that
min
u2≤uˆ,u1≥u2
{r(G−1(u1), G−1(u2))− r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2))} (42)
is finite.
To do that, consider two cases: u1 ≤ uˆ and u1 > uˆ. Start with u1 ≤ uˆ. First,
r(G−1(u1), G−1(u2)) ≥ 0, because the gap between the maximum and runner-up bids is non-
negative. Second, −r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2)) ≥ −r(F−1(uˆ), 0), since u1 ≤ uˆ and min(F−1(u2), 0) ≥
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0. So
r(G−1(u1), G−1(u2))− r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2)) ≥ −r(F−1(uˆ), 0). (43)
If F−1(uˆ) ≤ 0, then the RHS is zero. If not, then it is −F−1(uˆ), which is finite because we
assume F−1(uˆ) <∞.
For the case u1 > uˆ,
r(G−1(u1), G−1(u2))− r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2)) (44)
= [r(G−1(uˆ), G−1(u2))− r(F−1(uˆ), F−1(u2))] (45)
+ [r(G−1(u1), G−1(uˆ))− r(F−1(u1), F−1(uˆ))]. (46)
The reasoning from the previous case (u1 ≤ uˆ) applies to the first square-bracketed term, so
it is finite. For the second square-bracketed term,
r(G−1(u1), G−1(uˆ))− r(F−1(u1), F−1(uˆ)) = [G−1(u1)−G−1(uˆ)]− [F−1(u1)−F−1(uˆ)], (47)
because G−1(uˆ) ≥ 0, F−1(uˆ) ≥ 0, and u1 > uˆ. We will show that
G−1(u1)−G−1(uˆ) > F−1(u1)− F−1(uˆ). (48)
Consider the integral ˆ F−1(u1)
x=F−1(uˆ)
f(x) dx (49)
By the definition of a cdf, this integral equals u1 − uˆ. Alternatively, perform a change of
variables to u = F (x), with du = f(x) dx :
ˆ u1
u=uˆ
du = u1 − uˆ. (50)
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Likewise, ˆ G−1(u1)
x=G−1(uˆ)
g(x) dx = u1 − uˆ. (51)
So ˆ G−1(u1)
x=G−1(uˆ)
g(x) dx =
ˆ F−1(u1)
x=F−1(uˆ)
f(x) dx . (52)
Therefore, the area under g over the interval [G−1(uˆ), G−1(u1)] is the same as the area under
f over the interval [F−1(uˆ), F−1(u1)]. Since we assume ∀u ≥ uˆ : g(G−1(u)) < f(F−1(u)),
the interval [G−1(uˆ), G−1(u1)] must be longer than the interval [F−1(uˆ), F−1(u1)], because
we must integrate over a longer interval to get the same area under a lower curve. So
G−1(u1) − G−1(uˆ) > F−1(u1) − F−1(uˆ), the second square-bracketed term is positive, I is
bounded from below, and it can be made arbitrarily small by choosing n sufficiently large.
Now we show that II is positive. Recall that II is
ˆ 1
u2=uˆ
ˆ 1
u1=u2
[r(G−1(u1), G−1(u2))− r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2))]p(u1, u2) du1 du2 . (53)
Since G−1(uˆ) ≥ 0 and F−1(uˆ) ≥ 0, G−1(u1), G−1(u2), F−1(u1), and F−1(u2) are all nonneg-
ative in this integral, because u1 ≥ uˆ and u2 ≥ uˆ. So
r(G−1(u1), G−1(u2))− r(F−1(u1), F−1(u2)) = [G−1(u1)−G−1(u2)]− [F−1(u1)− F−1(u2)].
(54)
Since u1 ≥ uˆ and u2 ≥ uˆ in II, we can use the reasoning from before about
[G−1(u1)−G−1(uˆ)]− [F−1(u1)− F−1(uˆ)], (55)
replacing uˆ by u2. We have equal integrals:
ˆ G−1(u1)
x=G−1(u2)
g(x) dx =
ˆ F−1(u1)
x=F−1(u2)
f(x) dx = u1 − u2. (56)
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Since ∀u ≥ uˆ : g(G−1(u)) < f(F−1(u)), the interval [G−1(u2), G−1(u1)] must be longer than
the interval [F−1(u2), F−1(u1)]. So
∀u1 ≥ u2 ≥ uˆ : [G−1(u1)−G−1(u2)] > [F−1(u1)− F−1(u2)]. (57)
As a result, II is positive.

APPENDIX B: Proof of Theorem 4
For SP expected revenue:
E {vs − zw} = E {vs − zs}+ E {zs − zw} . (58)
Note that
E {zs − zw} ≤ 0, (59)
because it is zero if zi are independent of vi and if positively correlated. (This is why we
require c ≥ 0 in the theorem.). So it remains to show that
E {vs˜ − zs˜} ≥ E {vs − zs} , (60)
where s is the index of the runner-up vi, and s˜ is the index of the runner-up vi − zi.
Recall that
zi = θcvi + (1− θ)yi, (61)
and
vi − zi = (1− cθ)vi − (1− θ)yi, (62)
where
vi ∼ N (µv, σv), (63)
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and
yi ∼ N (µy, σy). (64)
So
vi − zi ∼ N ((1− cθ)µv − (1− θ)µy,
√
(1− cθ)2σ2v + (1− θ)2σ2y). (65)
Since s is selected without reference to zi values,
E {zs|vs} = cθvs + (1− θ)µy. (66)
So, by the linearity of expectation,
E {vs − zs} = (1− cθ)E {vs} − (1− θ)µy. (67)
So we need to show that
E {vs˜ − zs˜} ≥ (1− cθ)E {vs} − (1− θ)µy. (68)
Let
αi =
(vi − zi) + (1− θ)µy
1− cθ . (69)
Since the mapping from vi− zi to αi preserves ordering, the runner-up αi corresponds to the
runner-up vi − zi. So we need to show that
E {αs˜} ≥ E {vs} . (70)
Note that
αi ∼ N (µv,
√√√√σ2v +
(
1− θ
1− cθ
)2
σ2y). (71)
So the distribution of αi has the same mean as that of vi and a greater variance.
We need to show that the second order statistic for a normal distribution is at least the
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second order statistic for another normal distribution that has the same mean and a lower
variance. For n > 3, this is true because an order statistic in the upper half of the sample has
a higher mean for the higher-variance normal simply because higher variance makes higher
values more likely. For n = 3, it is true because the mean of the second order statistic is the
same as the mean of the distributions: µv. To see this, note that any set of three sample
values from a distribution that is symmetric about its mean has the same likelihood as the
set of reflections of the three values across the mean. But the reflected runner up is the
runner up of the reflected sample set, and it is on the opposite side of the mean and equally
distant from it. So the two runner ups average to the mean of the distribution. 
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